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Message-ID: <dc394cfe-b195-a4ba-708b-70bffc8d43a6@bluepopcorn.net> Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2017 14:54:21 -0800 From: Jim Fenton <fenton@...epopcorn.net> To: passwords@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Real world password policies On 11/8/17 2:32 PM, Jim Fenton wrote: > On 11/3/17 1:29 PM, Arnold Reinhold wrote: >>> On Oct 30, 2017, at 5:06 PM, Jim Fenton <fenton@...epopcorn.net> wrote: >>> >>> >> … >>> The approach is different for offline attacks: in addition to salting and iterated hashing with an expensive key derivation function, SP 800-63B recommends an additional keyed hash with the key stored separately (as in an HSM, or on a separate machine not otherwise accessible). So if the verifier can keep the key secret, the hashes aren't usable by password cracking at all. >>> >>> Additional guidelines on the size and composition of blacklists is planned for the implementation guide that is a companion to SP 800-63B, currently under development. >>> >> The NIST SP800-63B recommendation to hash password verification data using a key stored separately in some sort of protected hardware is a big step forward, but it comes at the end of a string of SHOULDs (vs SHALLs) in the document. I realize the guidelines are only a few months old, but is there any momentum, either in the U.S. Government or the private sector towards implementing that recommendation? > The recommendation to do an additional keyed hash with a key stored > separately is completely new in 800-63. While I'm convinced that's a > really good thing to do, I don't know if anyone who is doing it yet, and > making it a SHALL is a bit abrupt. We need to be mindful that there are > many authentication systems used by the government, and we can't > arbitrarily make some of them (perhaps based on commerical products) > suddenly out of compliance. > > The specification doesn't actually call for a hardware implementation > (e.g., HSA) of this. A reasonable solution might be to stand up a > separate server, not accessible from outside, that accepts password > hashes and rehashes them with the private key. In my "spare time" I'm > working on a proof-of-concept for this that I plan to open-source. > Shouldn't take long. To close the loop on this, I have published a simple utility for doing this. The code is at https://github.com/jimfenton/rehash and I have described it further at https://altmode.org/2017/12/05/protecting-passwords-against-cracking-with-rehash/ -Jim
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