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Message-ID: <20261120152207.GA12649@openwall.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 16:22:07 +0100
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
Cc: Lukas Tribus <lukas@...i.eu>, musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: crypt: unsupported hash behavior

On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 09:41:46AM -0500, Rich Felker wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 01:38:25PM +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
> > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 07:23:14AM -0500, Rich Felker wrote:
> > > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 10:53:00AM +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
> > > > Not addressing the issue of leaving the hash in memory yet, but I assume
> > > > that's intentional not to address in this same patch?
> > > 
> > > Yeah I wasn't sure what to best do with that. I thought of having the
> > > loop that computes the sum also xor the setting string onto the
> > > output, which would be a great way to keep a dependency and avoid
> > > short-circuiting the loop, but that leaks setting (good hash) on
> > > failure which is even worse. I guess I could just make the loop
> > > overwrite output as it runs -- that might be worthwhile.
> > 
> > I had thought of this too, but the problem is we don't know we need to
> > overwrite output until the loop ends.  Also the early exit on
> > strlen(_setting) != 13 must not skip the zeroization.
> 
> Oh, yes. In that case, I think we should probably just leave this
> aspect alone for now.

OK, I agree.

> Leaving the hash *of the caller submitted
> password* in the caller's buffer is not really a big deal anyway.

It's in the caller's buffer only with crypt_r(), otherwise with normal
crypt() it's our output buffer.

> As a separate change later, I do have an idea for this: when the crypt
> core produces a failure, we could have the subsequent self-test write
> to the caller's output buffer instead of a test_buf. This could be
> applied to all of the crypt backends, though I'm not sure if any have
> other data worth clobbering.

Like I wrote in a previous message in this thread:

One way to deal with this could be to use the output pointer in place of
test_buf in the self-test call if retval is NULL by that point:

-	p = _crypt_extended_r_uut(test_key, test_setting, test_buf);
+       p = _crypt_extended_r_uut(test_key, test_setting, retval ? test_buf : output);

but that's dangerous in a different way: the passed struct crypt_data
would then get a fixed hash into it corresponding to our known test
password.  So if any caller to crypt_r() uses that, or any caller to
crypt() reuses a previous call's returned pointer (of course either
behavior would be a bug), they may be vulnerable.

> Right now though I'd just like to finish getting a version of the
> non-canonical DES salts change that can be included in the bugfix
> release and that distros paranoid about related issues can go ahead
> and feel good about applying.

Makes sense.

Alexander

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