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Message-ID: <20261120155812.GK5716@brightrain.aerifal.cx> Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 10:58:12 -0500 From: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> To: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com> Cc: Lukas Tribus <lukas@...i.eu>, musl@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: crypt: unsupported hash behavior On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 04:22:07PM +0100, Solar Designer wrote: > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 09:41:46AM -0500, Rich Felker wrote: > > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 01:38:25PM +0100, Solar Designer wrote: > > > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 07:23:14AM -0500, Rich Felker wrote: > > > > On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 10:53:00AM +0100, Solar Designer wrote: > > > > > Not addressing the issue of leaving the hash in memory yet, but I assume > > > > > that's intentional not to address in this same patch? > > > > > > > > Yeah I wasn't sure what to best do with that. I thought of having the > > > > loop that computes the sum also xor the setting string onto the > > > > output, which would be a great way to keep a dependency and avoid > > > > short-circuiting the loop, but that leaks setting (good hash) on > > > > failure which is even worse. I guess I could just make the loop > > > > overwrite output as it runs -- that might be worthwhile. > > > > > > I had thought of this too, but the problem is we don't know we need to > > > overwrite output until the loop ends. Also the early exit on > > > strlen(_setting) != 13 must not skip the zeroization. > > > > Oh, yes. In that case, I think we should probably just leave this > > aspect alone for now. > > OK, I agree. > > > Leaving the hash *of the caller submitted > > password* in the caller's buffer is not really a big deal anyway. > > It's in the caller's buffer only with crypt_r(), otherwise with normal > crypt() it's our output buffer. > > > As a separate change later, I do have an idea for this: when the crypt > > core produces a failure, we could have the subsequent self-test write > > to the caller's output buffer instead of a test_buf. This could be > > applied to all of the crypt backends, though I'm not sure if any have > > other data worth clobbering. > > Like I wrote in a previous message in this thread: > > One way to deal with this could be to use the output pointer in place of > test_buf in the self-test call if retval is NULL by that point: > > - p = _crypt_extended_r_uut(test_key, test_setting, test_buf); > + p = _crypt_extended_r_uut(test_key, test_setting, retval ? test_buf : output); > > but that's dangerous in a different way: the passed struct crypt_data > would then get a fixed hash into it corresponding to our known test > password. So if any caller to crypt_r() uses that, or any caller to > crypt() reuses a previous call's returned pointer (of course either > behavior would be a bug), they may be vulnerable. Oh, yes, I remember now. It's really looking like the best thing is not to do anything special with it, and just leave it as this patch leaves it. Rich
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