|
|
Message-ID: <20261107044646.GC23438@brightrain.aerifal.cx> Date: Fri, 6 Nov 2026 23:46:47 -0500 From: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> To: Yao Zi <me@...ao.cc> Cc: musl@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: OpenSSH password auth bypass analysis [was: Re: Advisory for OpenSSH+musl users] On Sat, Nov 07, 2026 at 03:57:55AM +0000, Yao Zi wrote: > On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 04:39:24PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote: > > Hi Rich, > > > > One comment on Item (5) below. > > > > On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 1:55 PM Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote: > > > > > > [...] > > > 5. Having a failure token not match any password is contingent on the > > > caller of crypt passing the correct hash as the settign argument to > > > crypt. While it's guaranteed that: > > > > > > crypt(pass,failure_token) != failure_token > > > > > > it is impossible to guarantee that: > > > > > > crypt(pass,some_other_hash) != failure_token > > > > I think you can bind the username _and_ (salt,password) to the hash, > > and that will ensure the conditions above behave as expected. That > > is, instead of storing the hash of (salt,password), instead store > > (username,salt,password). That should ensure a negligible probability > > in cases where two users happen to use the same password, like > > P@...ord1. > > This couldn't be achieved in the current way that crypt() is commonly > used, right? Two users happening to use the same password is not even the issue at hand. I don't understand the motivation for that suggestion. Rich
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.