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Message-ID: <au6hw0HOjwww8_CD@pie>
Date: Sat, 7 Nov 2026 03:57:55 +0000
From: Yao Zi <me@...ao.cc>
To: musl@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Yao Zi <me@...ao.cc>
Subject: Re: OpenSSH password auth bypass analysis [was: Re: 
 Advisory for OpenSSH+musl users]

On Fri, Nov 06, 2026 at 04:39:24PM -0500, Jeffrey Walton wrote:
> Hi Rich,
> 
> One comment on Item (5) below.
> 
> On Fri, Nov 6, 2026 at 1:55 PM Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org> wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> > 5. Having a failure token not match any password is contingent on the
> > caller of crypt passing the correct hash as the settign argument to
> > crypt. While it's guaranteed that:
> >
> >         crypt(pass,failure_token) != failure_token
> >
> > it is impossible to guarantee that:
> >
> >         crypt(pass,some_other_hash) != failure_token
> 
> I think you can bind the username _and_ (salt,password) to the hash,
> and that will ensure the conditions above behave as expected.  That
> is, instead of storing the hash of (salt,password), instead store
> (username,salt,password).  That should ensure a negligible probability
> in cases where two users happen to use the same password, like
> P@...ord1.

This couldn't be achieved in the current way that crypt() is commonly
used, right?

> Jeff

Regards,
Yao Zi

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