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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 11:52:41 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <>
To: Al Viro <>,
	James Morris <>,
	Serge Hallyn <>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <>,
	Andy Lutomirski <>,
	Casey Schaufler <>,
	Christian Brauner <>,
	Christoph Hellwig <>,
	David Howells <>,
	Dominik Brodowski <>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <>,
	John Johansen <>,
	Kees Cook <>,
	Kentaro Takeda <>,
	Tetsuo Handa <>,,,,
Subject: [PATCH v3 0/1] Unprivileged chroot


This new patch replaces the path_is_under() check with
current_chrooted() as it is done with user namespaces.  Indeed, it is
much more simple to check the current root instead of limiting access to
a subset of files.

The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability.  This protects against malicious
procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries.  The following patch
allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2), which may be
complementary to the use of user namespaces.

This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
time ago:

This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc2 .  I would really
appreciate constructive reviews.

Previous version:


Mickaël Salaün (1):
  fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)

 fs/open.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

base-commit: a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15

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