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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 11:42:55 +0100
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>,
Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,
Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>,
Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot
On 10/03/2021 21:59, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> On 3/10/2021 10:17 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> On 10/03/2021 18:22, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>>> On 3/10/2021 8:09 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with
>>>> the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability. This protects against malicious
>>>> procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries. The following patch
>>>> allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2).
>>> Mount namespaces have pretty well obsoleted chroot(). CAP_SYS_CHROOT is
>>> one of the few fine grained capabilities. We're still finding edge cases
>>> (e.g. ptrace) where no_new_privs is imperfect. I doesn't seem that there
>>> is a compelling reason to remove the privilege requirement on chroot().
>> What is the link between chroot and ptrace?
>
> The possibility of sophisticated interactions with no_new_privs.
Would you mind giving some practical examples?
>
>> What is interesting with CAP_SYS_CHROOT?
>
> CAP_SYS_CHROOT is specific to chroot. It doesn't give you privilege
> beyond what you expect, unlike CAP_CHOWN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Making chroot
> unprivileged is silly when it's possibly the best example of how the
> capability mechanism is supposed to work.
Why would it be silly to make the use of this feature safe for any
processes instead of giving the right (with CAP_SYS_CHROOT) to some
processes to use it unsafely?
>
>>
>>>> This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some
>>>> time ago:
>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/
>>>>
>>>> This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc2 . I would really
>>>> appreciate constructive reviews.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Mickaël Salaün (1):
>>>> fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2)
>>>>
>>>> fs/open.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>>> 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> base-commit: a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15
>
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