kernel-hardening mailing list
Recent messages:
- 2021/08/03 #1:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork (John Cotton Ericson <mail@...nEricson.me>)
- 2021/08/02 #1:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork (Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>)
- 2021/07/31 #2:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork (Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>)
- 2021/07/31 #1:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork ("John Ericson" <mail@...nericson.me>)
- 2021/07/30 #1:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork (Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>)
- 2021/07/29 #2:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork ("John Ericson" <list@...nericson.me>)
- 2021/07/29 #1:
Re: Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork (Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>)
- 2021/07/28 #1:
Leveraging pidfs for process creation without fork (John Cotton Ericson <mail@...nEricson.me>)
- 2021/07/05 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@...me>)
- 2021/07/04 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/07/03 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/07/02 #2:
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@...me>)
- 2021/07/02 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/07/01 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@...me>)
- 2021/06/26 #3:
回复: [PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow when length is bigger than 8 ("Zhou, Yun" <Yun.Zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/26 #2:
[PATCH 2/2] seq_buf: Make trace_seq_putmem_hex() support data longer than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/26 #1:
[PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow in seq_buf_putmem_hex() (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/25 #8:
Re: [PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow when length is bigger than 8 (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
- 2021/06/25 #7:
[PATCH 1/2] seq_buf: fix overflow when length is bigger than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/25 #6:
[PATCH 2/2] seq_buf: Make trace_seq_putmem_hex() support data longer than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/25 #5:
Re: [PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than
8 (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
- 2021/06/25 #4:
Re: [PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/25 #3:
Re: [PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/25 #2:
Re: [PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/25 #1:
Re: [PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than
8 (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
- 2021/06/24 #2:
Re: [PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than
8 (Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>)
- 2021/06/24 #1:
[PATCH] seq_buf: let seq_buf_putmem_hex support len larger than 8 (Yun Zhou <yun.zhou@...driver.com>)
- 2021/06/22 #1:
Re: [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021 (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
- 2021/06/17 #1:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>)
- 2021/06/15 #9:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run ("Kurt Manucredo" <fuzzybritches0@...il.com>)
- 2021/06/15 #8:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>)
- 2021/06/15 #7:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>)
- 2021/06/15 #6:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>)
- 2021/06/15 #5:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>)
- 2021/06/15 #4:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>)
- 2021/06/15 #3:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>)
- 2021/06/15 #2:
Re: [PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@...il.com>)
- 2021/06/15 #1:
[PATCH v5] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Kurt Manucredo <fuzzybritches0@...il.com>)
- 2021/06/11 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/10 #6:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>)
- 2021/06/10 #5:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>)
- 2021/06/10 #4:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- 2021/06/10 #3:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>)
- 2021/06/10 #2:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Yonghong Song <yhs@...com>)
- 2021/06/10 #1:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>)
- 2021/06/09 #2:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- 2021/06/09 #1:
Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- 2021/06/08 #4:
Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
- 2021/06/08 #3:
Re: [PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- 2021/06/08 #2:
Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del (Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@...cle.com>)
- 2021/06/08 #1:
Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del (Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>)
- 2021/06/07 #6:
Re: [syzbot] KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del (syzbot <syzbot+305a91e025a73e4fd6ce@...kaller.appspotmail.com>)
- 2021/06/07 #5:
Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del (SyzScope <syzscope@...il.com>)
- 2021/06/07 #4:
Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del (Greg KH <greg@...ah.com>)
- 2021/06/07 #3:
Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del (Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>)
- 2021/06/07 #2:
Re: KASAN: use-after-free Read in hci_chan_del ("Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>)
- 2021/06/07 #1:
Re: [PATCH v4] bpf: core: fix shift-out-of-bounds in ___bpf_prog_run (Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>)
- 2021/06/05 #9:
[PATCH v8 8/8] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #8:
[PATCH v8 7/8] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #7:
[PATCH v8 6/8] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #6:
[PATCH v8 5/8] security/brute: Notify to userspace "task killed" (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #5:
[PATCH v8 4/8] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #4:
[PATCH v8 3/8] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #3:
[PATCH v8 2/8] security/brute: Define a LSM and add sysctl attributes (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #2:
[PATCH v8 1/8] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/05 #1:
[PATCH v8 0/8] Fork brute force attack mitigation (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/06/02 #1:
Re: [PATCH v11 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
- 2021/05/25 #1:
Re: [ANNOUNCE][CFP] Linux Security Summit 2021 (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
- 2021/05/23 #3:
Re: [PATCH v7 0/7] Fork brute force attack mitigation (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/23 #2:
Re: [PATCH v7 0/7] Fork brute force attack mitigation (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
- 2021/05/23 #1:
Re: [PATCH v7 0/7] Fork brute force attack mitigation (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/22 #3:
[PATCH v7 7/7] MAINTAINERS: Add a new entry for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/22 #2:
[PATCH v7 6/7] Documentation: Add documentation for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/22 #1:
[PATCH v7 5/7] selftests/brute: Add tests for the Brute LSM (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/21 #6:
[PATCH v7 4/7] security/brute: Mitigate a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/21 #5:
Re: [PATCH v7 0/7] Fork brute force attack mitigation (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
- 2021/05/21 #4:
[PATCH v7 3/7] security/brute: Detect a brute force attack (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/21 #3:
[PATCH v7 2/7] security/brute: Define a LSM and add sysctl attributes (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/21 #2:
[PATCH v7 1/7] security: Add LSM hook at the point where a task gets a fatal signal (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/21 #1:
[PATCH v7 0/7] Fork brute force attack mitigation (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
- 2021/05/12 #1:
Re: [PATCH v11 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace (Alexey Gladkov <legion@...nel.org>)
- 2021/05/10 #2:
Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations ("Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/10 #1:
Re: [PATCH v11 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace (Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>)
- 2021/05/09 #1:
Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations (Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>)
- 2021/05/07 #3:
Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables ("Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/07 #2:
New mailing list for Landlock LSM user space discussions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- 2021/05/07 #1:
Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression (Oliver Sang <oliver.sang@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/06 #3:
Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables (Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@...gle.com>)
- 2021/05/06 #2:
Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables (Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>)
- 2021/05/06 #1:
Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables (Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/05 #26:
Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations ("Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/05 #25:
Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables ("Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/05 #24:
Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables ("Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/05 #23:
Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables ("Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com>)
- 2021/05/05 #22:
Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations (Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>)
- 2021/05/05 #21:
Re: [PATCH RFC 0/9] PKS write protected page tables (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- 2021/05/05 #20:
Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- 2021/05/05 #19:
Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations (Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>)
- 2021/05/05 #18:
Re: [PATCH RFC 5/9] x86, mm: Use cache of page tables (Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>)
- 2021/05/05 #17:
Re: [PATCH RFC 3/9] x86/mm/cpa: Add grouped page allocations (Mike Rapoport <rppt@...nel.org>)
21341 messages
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