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kernel-hardening mailing list

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
2021	93	161	244	84
2020	106	380	316	347	217	285	318	204	360	237	161	137
2019	254	356	92	351	159	301	354	157	139	231	245	88
2018	493	506	786	332	302	229	160	150	100	262	195	244
2017	358	642	364	408	549	685	342	443	323	380	464	244
2016	371	158	158	222	207	464	379	350	213	459	218	439
2015					3	1	4				205	184
2014	2			6	4
2013	5	10	8	168	1	1		22	25	155		6
2012	30	224	176	84	39	12	18	30	7	13		8
2011						187	185	149	131	8	66	38

Recent messages:

2021/04/11 #1: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
2021/04/09 #8: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions ("Valdis Klētnieks" <valdis.kletnieks@...edu>)
2021/04/09 #7: Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC) (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/09 #6: Re: [PATCH v12 0/3] Add trusted_for(2) (was O_MAYEXEC) (bauen1 <j2468h@...glemail.com>)
2021/04/09 #5: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
2021/04/09 #4: Re: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
2021/04/09 #3: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
2021/04/09 #2: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
2021/04/09 #1: Re: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
2021/04/08 #6: Re: [PATCH v33 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>)
2021/04/08 #5: Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
2021/04/08 #4: Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/08 #3: Re: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
2021/04/08 #2: 08ed4efad6: stress-ng.sigsegv.ops_per_sec -41.9% regression (kernel test robot <oliver.sang@...el.com>)
2021/04/08 #1: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions (Andi Kleen <ak@...ux.intel.com>)
2021/04/07 #29: Re: [PATCH v10 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts (kernel test robot <lkp@...el.com>)
2021/04/07 #28: Re: [PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>)
2021/04/07 #27: Re: [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>)
2021/04/07 #26: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions ("Valdis Klētnieks" <valdis.kletnieks@...edu>)
2021/04/07 #25: Re: Notify special task kill using wait* functions (John Wood <john.wood@....com>)
2021/04/07 #24: [PATCH v10 9/9] ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #23: [PATCH v10 8/9] kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #22: [PATCH v10 7/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #21: [PATCH v10 6/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #20: [PATCH v10 5/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #19: [PATCH v10 4/9] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #18: [PATCH v10 3/9] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #17: [PATCH v10 2/9] Add a reference to ucounts for each cred (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #16: [PATCH v10 1/9] Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #15: [PATCH v10 0/9] Count rlimits in each user namespace (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/07 #14: Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
2021/04/07 #13: [PATCH v33 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #12: [PATCH v33 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #11: [PATCH v33 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #10: [PATCH v33 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #9: [PATCH v33 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #8: [PATCH v33 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #7: [PATCH v33 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #6: [PATCH v33 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #5: [PATCH v33 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #4: [PATCH v33 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #3: [PATCH v33 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #2: [PATCH v33 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/07 #1: [PATCH v33 00/12] Landlock LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/06 #1: Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts (Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>)
2021/04/05 #4: Re: [PATCH v9 0/8] Count rlimits in each user namespace (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
2021/04/05 #3: Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
2021/04/05 #2: Re: [PATCH v9 6/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
2021/04/05 #1: Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts (ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman))
2021/04/02 #1: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Roy Yang <royyang@...gle.com>)
2021/04/01 #34: [PATCH v10 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #33: [PATCH v10 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #32: [PATCH v10 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #31: [PATCH v10 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #30: [PATCH v10 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #29: [PATCH v10 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #28: [PATCH v10 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #27: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #26: Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #25: Re: [PATCH v8 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall ("Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>)
2021/04/01 #24: [PATCH v32 12/12] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #23: [PATCH v32 11/12] samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #22: [PATCH v32 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add user space tests (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #21: [PATCH v32 09/12] arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #20: [PATCH v32 08/12] landlock: Add syscall implementations (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #19: [PATCH v32 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #18: [PATCH v32 06/12] fs,security: Add sb_delete hook (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #17: [PATCH v32 05/12] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #16: [PATCH v32 04/12] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #15: [PATCH v32 03/12] landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #14: [PATCH v32 02/12] landlock: Add ruleset and domain management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #13: [PATCH v32 01/12] landlock: Add object management (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #12: [PATCH v32 00/12] Landlock LSM (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #11: Re: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch? ("Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>)
2021/04/01 #10: Re: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch? (Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>)
2021/04/01 #9: [PATCH] Where we are for this patch? (Roy Yang <royyang@...gle.com>)
2021/04/01 #8: Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/04/01 #7: Re: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
2021/04/01 #6: RE: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (David Laight <David.Laight@...LAB.COM>)
2021/04/01 #5: Re: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>)
2021/04/01 #4: Re: [PATCH v7 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>)
2021/04/01 #3: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>)
2021/04/01 #2: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/04/01 #1: Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>)
2021/03/31 #15: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
2021/03/31 #14: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #13: [PATCH v9 5/6] arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #12: [PATCH v9 6/6] lkdtm: Add REPORT_STACK for checking stack offsets (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #11: [PATCH v9 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #10: [PATCH v9 1/6] jump_label: Provide CONFIG-driven build state defaults (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #9: [PATCH v9 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #8: [PATCH v9 2/6] init_on_alloc: Optimize static branches (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #7: [PATCH v9 0/6] Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #6: Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/31 #5: Re: [PATCH v31 07/12] landlock: Support filesystem access-control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
2021/03/31 #4: Re: [PATCH v8 3/6] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset each syscall (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
2021/03/31 #3: Re: [PATCH v8 4/6] x86/entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support (Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>)
2021/03/31 #2: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>)
2021/03/31 #1: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
2021/03/30 #15: Re: [PATCH v5 1/1] fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)

21191 messages

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