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Date: Mon, 4 Jan 2021 17:07:32 -0600
From: Josh Poimboeuf <>
To: Kees Cook <>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <>, Peter Zijlstra <>,
	"Paul E. McKenney" <>,
	Kalle Valo <>,
	Andrew Morton <>,
	Jakub Kicinski <>,
	Viresh Kumar <>,
	Andy Shevchenko <>,
	Geert Uytterhoeven <>,
	Olof Johansson <>,
	Chris Wilson <>,
	Thomas Gleixner <>,
	David Windsor <>,,,
	Rik van Riel <>, George Spelvin <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] bug: further enhance use of CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION

On Tue, Apr 04, 2017 at 03:12:11PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> This continues in applying the CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION tests where
> appropriate, and pulling similar CONFIGs under the same check. Most
> notably, this adds the checks to refcount_t so that system builders can
> Oops their kernels when encountering a potential refcounter attack. (And
> so now the LKDTM tests for refcount issues pass correctly.)
> The series depends on the changes in -next made to lib/refcount.c,
> so it might be easiest if this goes through the locking tree...
> v2 is a rebase to -next and adjusts to using WARN_ONCE() instead of WARN().
> -Kees
> v1 was here:

Ping?  Just wondering what ever happened to this 3+ year old series...


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