[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2020 15:38:32 +0300
From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, x86@...nel.org,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will@...nel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Alexander Potapenko
<glider@...gle.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>,
Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, linux-mm@...ck.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/5] stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack offset
each syscall
On 22.06.2020 22:31, Kees Cook wrote:
> As Linux kernel stack protections have been constantly improving
> (vmap-based stack allocation with guard pages, removal of thread_info,
> STACKLEAK), attackers have had to find new ways for their exploits
> to work. They have done so, continuing to rely on the kernel's stack
> determinism, in situations where VMAP_STACK and THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK_STRUCT
> were not relevant. For example, the following recent attacks would have
> been hampered if the stack offset was non-deterministic between syscalls:
>
> https://repositorio-aberto.up.pt/bitstream/10216/125357/2/374717.pdf
> (page 70: targeting the pt_regs copy with linear stack overflow)
>
> https://a13xp0p0v.github.io/2020/02/15/CVE-2019-18683.html
> (leaked stack address from one syscall as a target during next syscall)
>
> The main idea is that since the stack offset is randomized on each system
> call, it is harder for an attack to reliably land in any particular place
> on the thread stack, even with address exposures, as the stack base will
> change on the next syscall. Also, since randomization is performed after
> placing pt_regs, the ptrace-based approach[1] to discover the randomized
> offset during a long-running syscall should not be possible.
Hello Kees!
I would recommend to disable CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS if kernel stack offset
randomization is enabled. It is a debugging feature that provides information
about kernel stack usage. That info can be useful for calculating the random offset.
I would also recommend to check: there might be other kernel features for
debugging or getting statistics that can be used to disclose the random stack
offset.
Best regards,
Alexander
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
