Openwall GNU/*/Linux - a small security-enhanced Linux distro for servers
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Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2020 18:15:14 +0300
From: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@...il.com>
To: Alexey Gladkov <gladkov.alexey@...il.com>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>,
	Linux Security Module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
	Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@...il.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
	Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>,
	"Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>,
	"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>,
	"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@...ldses.org>,
	Jeff Layton <jlayton@...chiereds.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@...hat.com>,
	Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>,
	Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 00/10] proc: modernize proc to support multiple
 private instances

>  	hidepid=	Set /proc/<pid>/ access mode.
>  	gid=		Set the group authorized to learn processes information.
> +	pidonly=	Show only task related subset of procfs.

I'd rather have

	mount -t proc -o set=pid

so that is can be naturally extended to 

	mount -t proc -o set=pid,sysctl,misc

> +static int proc_dir_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> +{
> +	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
> +
> +	if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info) == PROC_PIDONLY_ON)
> +		return -ENOENT;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * These are the generic /proc directory operations. They
>   * use the in-memory "struct proc_dir_entry" tree to parse
> @@ -338,6 +357,7 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_dir_operations = {
>  	.llseek			= generic_file_llseek,
>  	.read			= generic_read_dir,
>  	.iterate_shared		= proc_readdir,
> +	.open			= proc_dir_open,

This should not be necessary: if lookup and readdir filters work
then ->open can't happen.

>  static int proc_reg_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
>  {
> +	struct proc_fs_info *fs_info = proc_sb_info(inode->i_sb);
>  	struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(inode);
>  	int rv = 0;
>  	typeof_member(struct file_operations, open) open;
>  	typeof_member(struct file_operations, release) release;
>  	struct pde_opener *pdeo;
>  
> +	if (proc_fs_pidonly(fs_info) == PROC_PIDONLY_ON)
> +		return -ENOENT;

Ditto. Can't open what can't be looked up.

> --- a/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/proc_fs.h
> +/* definitions for hide_pid field */
> +enum {
> +	HIDEPID_OFF	  = 0,
> +	HIDEPID_NO_ACCESS = 1,
> +	HIDEPID_INVISIBLE = 2,
> +	HIDEPID_NOT_PTRACABLE = 3, /* Limit pids to only ptracable pids */
> +};

These should live in uapi/ as they _are_ user interface to mount().

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