[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Thu, 8 Nov 2018 21:25:37 +0100
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>
To: Ahmed Abd El Mawgood <ahmedsoliman0x666@...il.com>, rkrcmar@...hat.com,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>,
hpa@...or.com, x86@...nel.org, kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, ovich00@...il.com,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, nigel.edwards@....com,
Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>,
Hossam Hassan <7ossam9063@...il.com>,
"Ahmed Lotfy igor . stoppa @ gmail . com" <A7med.lotfey@...il.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V6 0/8] KVM: X86: Introducing ROE Protection Kernel
Hardening
On 04/11/2018 18:11, Ahmed Abd El Mawgood wrote:
> Our model assumes that an attacker got full root access to a running guest and
> his goal is to manipulate kernel code/data (hook syscalls, overwrite IDT ..etc).
>
> There is future work in progress to also put some sort of protection on the page
> table register CR3 and other critical registers that can be intercepted by KVM.
> This way it won't be possible for an attacker to manipulate any part of the
> guests page table.
>
Do you have patches that enable usage of ROE in the kernel?
Alternatively you can write testcases in tools/testing/selftests/kvm to
test how guests should use it.
I would remove CONFIG_KVM_ROE altogether. You can enable it
unconditionally.
I will continue reviewing the patches soon.
Paolo
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
