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Date: Thu, 08 Mar 2018 16:52:22 -0600
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@...gle.com>, "Serge E. Hallyn"
<serge@...lyn.com>, Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) <maheshb@...gle.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [PATCHv4 0/2] capability controlled user-namespaces
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> writes:
> Perhaps try a repost upstream for possible merging to 4.16.
I have a real concern that capability controlled user namespaces
are only good for CAP_NET_RAW and CAP_NET_ADMIN. They don't appear
general.
I think this should be discussed on the linux hardening mailing list.
As that is what we are really talking about something to reduce the
attack surface of the kernel. Possibly after it has shipped.
In some well defined way.
That feels to me like a project for profiling tools, and some bpf programs
that attach to functions and call permissions.
Either that or something like my count of maximum number of namespaces.
Which appears to be just as usable as capability controlled user
namespaces.
I am very sympathetic but this does not appear to be a general solution
to a general problem. The general problem being how to reduce the
attack surface of the kernel.
Especially when the end goal is fixing the relevant kernel code and
removing the restrictions I don't see why a weird kernel patch with
oddball semantics can help.
Eric
> On Mon, 26 Feb 2018, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Feb 5, 2018 at 6:40 AM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> wrote:
>> > Quoting Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार) (maheshb@...gle.com):
>> >> -everyone (just keeping the relevant people)
>> >>
>> >> Hi James and Eric,
>> >>
>> >> I would really like to know how we can proceed with this patch-series.
>> >> At this moment it does seem like this is the only solution (unless
>> >> something is in the kitchen that solves this problem differently that
>> >> I'm not aware of) to reduce the surface attack and address 0day
>> >> vulnerabilities. I have been trying this for last 6+ months now and
>> >> most of the questions are answered. I really appreciate the feedback /
>> >> queries / questions received in making this a better solution from
>> >> Serge.
>> >>
>> >> The last status that I know from this and other mail-thread is that
>> >> James wants to know Eric's take. Eric wanted to see if no_new_privs
>> >> way solves the problem. To which I have replied.
>> >>
>> >> I would really love to see if there is any blockage that I can clear
>> >> and why this has been held back.
>> >>
>> >> So Eric, please respond (publicly or to this thread) to make me
>> >
>> > Hey Eric,
>> >
>> > ping?
>> >
>> > (ack or nack, let's not leave him hanging :)
>>
>>
>> Hmm...
>>
>> Eric Biederman , what can we do to unblock this ?
>>
>> We can pretend the issue does not exist, until something bad happens.
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>>
>> >> understand why this can/cannot make into linux and make it easier for
>> >> James to decide when/how/what to pull as far as this patch-series is
>> >> concerned.
>> >>
>> >> [I don't mean to hurt anyone by being direct so please accept my
>> >> sincere apologies if that happened.]
>> >>
>> >> Thanks,
>> >> --mahesh..
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 9:53 PM, Mahesh Bandewar (महेश बंडेवार)
>> >> <maheshb@...gle.com> wrote:
>> >> > On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 8:44 AM, Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com> wrote:
>> >> >> Mahesh Bandewar <mahesh@...dewar.net> writes:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>> From: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@...gle.com>
>> >> >>>
>> >> >>> TL;DR version
>> >> >>> -------------
>> >> >>> Creating a sandbox environment with namespaces is challenging
>> >> >>> considering what these sandboxed processes can engage into. e.g.
>> >> >>> CVE-2017-6074, CVE-2017-7184, CVE-2017-7308 etc. just to name few.
>> >> >>> Current form of user-namespaces, however, if changed a bit can allow
>> >> >>> us to create a sandbox environment without locking down user-
>> >> >>> namespaces.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> In other conversations it appears it has been pointed out that user
>> >> >> namespaces are not necessarily safe under no_new_privs. In theory
>> >> >> user namespaces should be safe but in practice not so much.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> So let me ask. Would your concerns be addressed if we simply made
>> >> >> creation and joining of user namespaces impossible in a no_new_privs
>> >> >> sandbox?
>> >> >>
>> >> > Isn't this another form of locking down user-ns similar to setting per
>> >> > user-ns sysctl max_userns = 0?
>> >> >
>> >> > Having said that, not allowing processes to create and/or attach
>> >> > user-namespaces is going to be problematic and possibly a regression.
>> >> > This (current) patchset doesn't do that. It allows users to create
>> >> > user-ns's of any depth and number permitted by per-ns max_userns
>> >> > sysctl. However one can decide what to take-off and what to leave in
>> >> > terms of capabilities for the sandbox environment.
>> >> >
>> >> > --mahesh..
>> >> >
>> >> >> Eric
>> >> >>
>> >>
>> >> > [...]
>>
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