[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <20171129172852.GA14545@mail.hallyn.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 11:28:52 -0600
From: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@....edu>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>,
gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk, keescook@...omium.org,
mcgrof@...nel.org, tixxdz@...il.com, luto@...nel.org,
akpm@...ux-foundation.org, james.l.morris@...cle.com,
ben.hutchings@...ethink.co.uk, solar@...nwall.com, serge@...lyn.com,
jeyu@...nel.org, rusty@...tcorp.com.au,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, corbet@....net,
mingo@...nel.org, netdev@...r.kernel.org, peterz@...radead.org,
torvalds@...ux-foundation.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 next 1/5] modules:capabilities: add
request_module_cap()
Quoting Theodore Ts'o (tytso@....edu):
> Half the problem here is that with containers, people are changing the
> security model, because they want to let untrusted users have "root",
> without really having "root". Part of the fundamental problem is that
> there are some well-meaning, but fundamentally misguided people, who
> have been asserting: "Containers are just as secure as VM's".
>
> Well, they are not. And the sooner people get past this, the better
> off they'll be....
Just to be clear, module loading requires - and must always continue to
require - CAP_SYS_MODULE against the initial user namespace. Containers
in user namespaces do not have that.
I don't believe anyone has ever claimed that containers which are not in
a user namespace are in any way secure.
(And as for the other claim, I'd prefer to stick to "VMs are in most
cases as insecure as properly configured containers" :)
-serge
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
