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Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 11:04:55 +0200
From: Greg KH <>
To: Stephan Mueller <>
Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <>,,,,,,,
	Herbert Xu <>,
	Kirill Marinushkin <>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <>,
	Ilhan Gurel <>,,
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of
 big_key crypto

On Mon, Sep 18, 2017 at 10:49:56AM +0200, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Samstag, 16. September 2017, 15:00:34 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
> Hi Jason,
> > This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
> > get_random_bytes_wait, 
> This change is a challenge. The use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG has been 
> made to allow FIPS 140-2 compliance. Otherwise, the entire key generation 
> logic will not be using the right(TM) DRNG. Thus, I would not suggest to 
> replace that for a stable tree.

Why not?  What is the issue here, there is only one "DRNG" in the kernel
now (and probably for a long time...)

> Note, I am currently working on a pluggable DRNG apporach for /dev/random and 
> /dev/urandom to be able to get rid of the use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG 
> API. It is ready and I will air that solution shortly. Yet, it needs work to 
> be integrated upstream (and approval from Ted Tso).

We don't postpone work for potential future patches that might or might
not ever happen or get merged.  That's how NetBSD died...


greg k-h

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