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Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 10:49:56 +0200
From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@...onox.de>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, keyrings@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, dhowells@...hat.com, ebiggers3@...il.com, Herbert Xu <herbert@...dor.apana.org.au>, Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@...il.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Ilhan Gurel <ilhan.gurel@...il.com>, security@...nel.org, stable@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto
Am Samstag, 16. September 2017, 15:00:34 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Hi Jason,
> This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
> get_random_bytes_wait,
This change is a challenge. The use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG has been
made to allow FIPS 140-2 compliance. Otherwise, the entire key generation
logic will not be using the right(TM) DRNG. Thus, I would not suggest to
replace that for a stable tree.
Note, I am currently working on a pluggable DRNG apporach for /dev/random and
/dev/urandom to be able to get rid of the use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG
API. It is ready and I will air that solution shortly. Yet, it needs work to
be integrated upstream (and approval from Ted Tso).
Ciao
Stephan
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