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Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 05:27:32 -0700
From: Davidlohr Bueso <>
To: Kees Cook <>
Cc:, Christoph Hellwig <>,
	Peter Zijlstra <>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <>,
	Andrew Morton <>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <>,
	PaX Team <>, Jann Horn <>,
	Eric Biggers <>,
	Elena Reshetova <>,
	Hans Liljestrand <>,
	David Windsor <>,
	Greg KH <>,
	Ingo Molnar <>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <>,,
	Manfred Spraul <>,
	"" <>,
	James Bottomley <>,
	"" <>, Ingo Molnar <>,
	Arnd Bergmann <>,
	"David S. Miller" <>,
	Rik van Riel <>,
	linux-arch <>,
	"" <>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] Implement fast refcount overflow protection

On Tue, 30 May 2017, Kees Cook wrote:

>A new patch has been added at the start of this series to make the default
>refcount_t implementation just use an unchecked atomic_t implementation,
>since many kernel subsystems want to be able to opt out of the full
>validation, since it includes a small performance overhead. When enabling
>CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, the full validation is used.
>The other two patches provide overflow protection on x86 without incurring
>a performance penalty. The changelog for patch 3 is reproduced here for

To be sure I'm getting this right, after this all archs with the exception
of x86 will use the regular atomic_t ("unsecure") flavor, right?


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