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Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 13:57:04 +0200
From: Djalal Harouni <>
	Andy Lutomirski <>,
	Kees Cook <>,
	Andrew Morton <>,
	Rusty Russell <>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <>,
	Jessica Yu <>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <>,
	James Morris <>,
	Paul Moore <>,
	Stephen Smalley <>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <>,
	Tetsuo Handa <>,
	Ingo Molnar <>,
	Linux API <>,
	Dongsu Park <>,
	Casey Schaufler <>,
	Jonathan Corbet <>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <>,
	Mauro Carvalho Chehab <>,
	Peter Zijlstra <>,
	Zendyani <>,,
	Al Viro <>,
	Ben Hutchings <>,
	Djalal Harouni <>
Subject: [PATCH v4 next 1/3] modules:capabilities: allow __request_module() to take a capability argument

This is a preparation patch for the module auto-load restriction feature.

In order to restrict module auto-load operations we need to check if the
caller has CAP_SYS_MODULE capability. This allows to align security
checks of automatic module loading with the checks of the explicit operations.

However for "netdev-%s" modules, they are allowed to be loaded if
CAP_NET_ADMIN is set. Therefore, in order to not break this assumption,
and allow userspace to only load "netdev-%s" modules with CAP_NET_ADMIN
capability which is considered a privileged operation, we have two
choices: 1) parse "netdev-%s" alias and check the capability or 2) hand
the capability form request_module() to security_kernel_module_request()
hook and let the capability subsystem decide.

After a discussion with Rusty Russell [1], the suggestion was to pass
the capability from request_module() to security_kernel_module_request()
for 'netdev-%s' modules that need CAP_NET_ADMIN.

The patch does not update request_module(), it updates the internal
__request_module() that will take an extra "allow_cap" argument. If
positive, then automatic module load operation can be allowed.

__request_module() will be only called by networking code which is the
exception to this, so we do not break userspace and CAP_NET_ADMIN can
continue to load 'netdev-%s' modules. Other kernel code should continue
to use request_module() which calls security_kernel_module_request() and
will check for CAP_SYS_MODULE capability in next patch. Allowing more
control on who can trigger automatic module loading.

This patch updates security_kernel_module_request() to take the
'allow_cap' argument and SELinux which is currently the only user of
security_kernel_module_request() hook.

Based on patch by Rusty Russell:

Cc: Serge Hallyn <>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <>
Suggested-by: Rusty Russell <>
Suggested-by: Kees Cook <>
Signed-off-by: Djalal Harouni <>

 include/linux/kmod.h      | 15 ++++++++-------
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  4 +++-
 include/linux/security.h  |  4 ++--
 kernel/kmod.c             | 15 +++++++++++++--
 net/core/dev_ioctl.c      | 10 +++++++++-
 security/security.c       |  4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c  |  2 +-
 7 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h
index c4e441e..a314432 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmod.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmod.h
@@ -32,18 +32,19 @@
 extern char modprobe_path[]; /* for sysctl */
 /* modprobe exit status on success, -ve on error.  Return value
  * usually useless though. */
-extern __printf(2, 3)
-int __request_module(bool wait, const char *name, ...);
-#define request_module(mod...) __request_module(true, mod)
-#define request_module_nowait(mod...) __request_module(false, mod)
+extern __printf(3, 4)
+int __request_module(bool wait, int allow_cap, const char *name, ...);
 #define try_then_request_module(x, mod...) \
-	((x) ?: (__request_module(true, mod), (x)))
+	((x) ?: (__request_module(true, -1, mod), (x)))
-static inline int request_module(const char *name, ...) { return -ENOSYS; }
-static inline int request_module_nowait(const char *name, ...) { return -ENOSYS; }
+static inline __printf(3, 4)
+int __request_module(bool wait, int allow_cap, const char *name, ...)
+{ return -ENOSYS; }
 #define try_then_request_module(x, mod...) (x)
+#define request_module(mod...) __request_module(true, -1, mod)
+#define request_module_nowait(mod...) __request_module(false, -1, mod)
 struct cred;
 struct file;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index f7914d9..7688f79 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -578,6 +578,8 @@
  *	Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
  *	userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
  *	@kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
+ *	@allow_cap capability that allows to automatically load a kernel
+ *	module.
  *	Return 0 if successful.
  * @kernel_read_file:
  *	Read a file specified by userspace.
@@ -1516,7 +1518,7 @@ union security_list_options {
 	void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 	int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 	int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
+	int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name, int allow_cap);
 	int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 	int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				     enum kernel_read_file_id id);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 549cb82..2f4c9d3 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
 void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
 int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
-int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name, int allow_cap);
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
 int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 				   enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ static inline int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *cred,
 	return 0;
-static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+static inline int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name, int allow_cap)
 	return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 563f97e..15c96e8 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static int call_modprobe(char *module_name, int wait)
  * __request_module - try to load a kernel module
  * @wait: wait (or not) for the operation to complete
+ * @allow_cap: if positive, may allow modprobe if this capability is set.
  * @fmt: printf style format string for the name of the module
  * @...: arguments as specified in the format string
@@ -120,10 +121,20 @@ static int call_modprobe(char *module_name, int wait)
  * must check that the service they requested is now available not blindly
  * invoke it.
+ * If "allow_cap" is positive, The security subsystem will trust the caller
+ * that "allow_cap" may allow to load some modules with a specific alias,
+ * the security subsystem will make some exceptions based on that. This is
+ * primally useful for backward compatibility. A permission check should not
+ * be that strict and userspace should be able to continue to trigger module
+ * auto-loading if needed.
+ *
  * If module auto-loading support is disabled then this function
  * becomes a no-operation.
+ *
+ * This function should not be directly used by other subsystems, for that
+ * please call request_module().
-int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
+int __request_module(bool wait, int allow_cap, const char *fmt, ...)
 	va_list args;
 	char module_name[MODULE_NAME_LEN];
@@ -150,7 +161,7 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
 	if (ret >= MODULE_NAME_LEN)
 		return -ENAMETOOLONG;
-	ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name);
+	ret = security_kernel_module_request(module_name, allow_cap);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
diff --git a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c
index b94b1d2..c494351 100644
--- a/net/core/dev_ioctl.c
+++ b/net/core/dev_ioctl.c
@@ -366,8 +366,16 @@ void dev_load(struct net *net, const char *name)
 	no_module = !dev;
+	/*
+	 * First do the CAP_NET_ADMIN check, then let the security
+	 * subsystem checks know that this can be allowed since this is
+	 * a "netdev-%s" module and CAP_NET_ADMIN is set.
+	 *
+	 * For this exception call __request_module().
+	 */
 	if (no_module && capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
-		no_module = request_module("netdev-%s", name);
+		no_module = __request_module(true, CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+					     "netdev-%s", name);
 	if (no_module && capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE))
 		request_module("%s", name);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 714433e..cedb790 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1021,9 +1021,9 @@ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
-int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name, int allow_cap)
-	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
+	return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name, allow_cap);
 int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 158f6a0..85eeff6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3842,7 +3842,7 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	return ret;
-static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
+static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name, int allow_cap)
 	struct common_audit_data ad;

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