Date: Mon, 8 May 2017 12:32:50 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@...il.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@...radead.org>, "axboe@...nel.dk" <axboe@...nel.dk>, James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...senpartnership.com>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@...il.com>, David Windsor <dwindsor@...il.com>, "x86@...nel.org" <x86@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com> Subject: [PATCH v3 0/2] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection This protection is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT implementation from PaX/grsecurity, prior to the use of named text sections. This speeds up the refcount_t API by duplicating the existing atomic_t implementation with a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has wrapped past INT_MAX (or below 0) resulting in a signed value. With this overflow protection, the use-after-free following a refcount_t wrap is blocked from happening, avoiding the vulnerability entirely. While this defense only perfectly protects the overflow case, as that can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker, it also notices some of the "inc from 0" and "below 0" cases. However, these only indicate that a use-after-free has already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them than allow such conditions to remain silent. On overflow detection (actually "negative value" detection), the refcount value is reset to INT_MAX, the offending process is killed, and a report is generated. This allows the system to attempt to keep operating. Another option, though not done in this patch, would be to reset the counter to (INT_MIN / 2) to trap all future refcount inc or dec actions, but this would result in even legitimate uses getting blocked. Yet another option would be to choose (INT_MAX - N) with some small N to provide some headroom for legitimate users of the reference counter. On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is signed, every inc will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition. As for performance, this implementation adds a single "jns" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the regular atomic_t operations, making this comparable to the existing atomic_t operations. The reporting routine uses an interupt vector to trap to return back to C to do the heavy lifting, to help keep the change in .text size minimal. Various differences from PaX: - based on earlier implementation prior to named text sections - applied only to refcount_t, not atomic_t - rebased to -next - reorganized refcount error handler - uses "jns" instead of "jno" to trap all negative results instead of just under/overflow transitions -Kees v3: - drop named text sections until we need to distinguish sizes/directions - reset value immediately instead of passing back to handler - drop needless export; josh v2: - fix instruction pointer decrement bug; thejh - switch to js; pax-team - improve commit log - extract rmwcc macro helpers for better readability - implemented checks in inc_not_zero interface - adjusted reset values
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