Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 12:55:07 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <>
To: Mickaël Salaün <>
Cc: LKML <>, Alexei Starovoitov <>, 
	Arnd Bergmann <>, Casey Schaufler <>, 
	Daniel Borkmann <>, Daniel Mack <>, 
	David Drysdale <>, "David S . Miller" <>, 
	Elena Reshetova <>, James Morris <>, 
	Kees Cook <>, Paul Moore <>, 
	Sargun Dhillon <>, "Serge E . Hallyn" <>, Will Drewry <>, 
	Kernel Hardening <>, Linux API <>, 
	LSM List <>, 
	Network Development <>, Tejun Heo <>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

On Tue, Aug 30, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Mickaël Salaün <> wrote:
> On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün <> wrote:
>>> Hi,
>>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
>>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
>>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
>>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
>>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
>>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
>>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.
>> Mickaël, will you be at KS and/or LPC?
> I won't be at KS/LPC but I will give a talk at Kernel Recipes (Paris)
> for which registration will start Thursday (and will not last long). :)

There's a teeny tiny chance I'll be there.  I've done way too much
traveling lately.

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.