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Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2016 21:51:36 +0200
From: Mickaël Salaün <>
To: Andy Lutomirski <>
Cc: LKML <>, Alexei Starovoitov <>,
        Arnd Bergmann <>,
        Casey Schaufler <>,
        Daniel Borkmann <>,
        Daniel Mack <>, David Drysdale <>,
        "David S . Miller"
        Elena Reshetova <>,
        James Morris <>,
        Kees Cook <>, Paul Moore <>,
        Sargun Dhillon <>,
        "Serge E . Hallyn" <>, Will Drewry <>,
        Kernel Hardening <>,
        Linux API <>,
        LSM List <>,
        Network Development <>,
        Tejun Heo <>
Subject: Re: [RFC v2 00/10] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing

On 30/08/2016 18:06, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Mickaël Salaün <> wrote:
>> Hi,
>> This series is a proof of concept to fill some missing part of seccomp as the
>> ability to check syscall argument pointers or creating more dynamic security
>> policies. The goal of this new stackable Linux Security Module (LSM) called
>> Landlock is to allow any process, including unprivileged ones, to create
>> powerful security sandboxes comparable to the Seatbelt/XNU Sandbox or the
>> OpenBSD Pledge. This kind of sandbox help to mitigate the security impact of
>> bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in userland applications.
> Mickaël, will you be at KS and/or LPC?

I won't be at KS/LPC but I will give a talk at Kernel Recipes (Paris)
for which registration will start Thursday (and will not last long). :)


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