Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2016 09:35:46 -0700 From: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> To: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization That's a use after free. The randomization of the freelist should not have much effect on that. I was going to quote this exploit that is applicable to SLAB as well: https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/09/10/linux-kernel-can-slub-overflow Regards. Thomas On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org> wrote: > On mer., 2016-04-06 at 14:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> > This security feature reduces the predictability of >> > the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows. >> >> I would add "... rendering attacks much less stable." And if you can >> find a specific example exploit that is foiled by this, I would refer >> to it. > > One good example might (or might not) be the keyring issue from earlier this > year (CVE-2016-0728): > > http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-ker > nel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ > > Regards, > -- > Yves-Alexis >
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