Date: Thu, 07 Apr 2016 18:17:47 +0200 From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org> To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Thelen <gthelen@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization On mer., 2016-04-06 at 14:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > This security feature reduces the predictability of > > the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows. > > I would add "... rendering attacks much less stable." And if you can > find a specific example exploit that is foiled by this, I would refer > to it. One good example might (or might not) be the keyring issue from earlier this year (CVE-2016-0728): http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-ker nel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ Regards, -- Yves-Alexis Download attachment "signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (474 bytes)
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