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Date: Thu, 07 Apr 2016 18:17:47 +0200
From: Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@...ian.org>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, 
 David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@....com>,
 Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Thelen
 <gthelen@...gle.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Linux-MM
 <linux-mm@...ck.org>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...oraproject.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization

On mer., 2016-04-06 at 14:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > This security feature reduces the predictability of
> > the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows.
> 
> I would add "... rendering attacks much less stable." And if you can
> find a specific example exploit that is foiled by this, I would refer
> to it.

One good example might (or might not) be the keyring issue from earlier this
year (CVE-2016-0728):

http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-ker
nel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/

Regards,
-- 
Yves-Alexis


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