Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 15:32:56 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au> Cc: "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86: introduce post-init read-only memory On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 3:05 PM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au> wrote: > On Wed, 2015-11-25 at 07:03 -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 4:54 PM, Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au> wrote: >> > On Tue, 2015-11-24 at 16:44 -0800, Kees Cook wrote: >> > > On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 4:34 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net> wrote: >> > > > On Nov 24, 2015 1:38 PM, "Kees Cook" <keescook@...omium.org> wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce >> > > > > the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By >> > > > > making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the >> > > > > attack surface. >> > > > > >> > > > > Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed >> > > > > again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong >> > > > > thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items >> > > > > into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro() >> > > > > which happens after all kernel __init code has finished. >> > > > > >> > > > > This introduces __read_only as a way to mark such memory, and adds some >> > > > > documentation about the existing __read_mostly marking. >> > > > >> > > > Obligatory bikeshed: __ro_after_init, please. It's barely longer, >> > > > and it directly explains what's going on. __read_only makes me think >> > > > that it's really read-only and could, for example, actually be in ROM. >> > > >> > > I'm fine with that. Anyone else want to chime in before I send a v2? >> > >> > I'm not clear on why this is x86 only? >> >> I was initially looking at how __read_mostly got implemented, and it >> seemed like section names were done on a per-arch basis. But it >> doesn't seem like that needs to be true. > > Yeah I saw that too, but I couldn't see anything in the commit history that > explained why it was per-arch. Best I was able to see was that architectures weren't (aren't?) using the common RODATA section macros in their linker scripts. From a quick inspection, I think these are all okay now. -Kees > >> > It looks like it would work on any arch, or is there some toolchain >> > requirement? >> >> Given that the other sections are in the common linux.lds.h file, it >> seems unlikely to me. I'll try it in an arch-agnostic way and see what >> happens. :) > > That'd be great, I can test on powerpc, and build test other arches too. > > cheers > > -- > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in > the body of a message to majordomo@...r.kernel.org > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html > Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security
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