[<prev] [next>] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-Id: <1448494286-16029-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 15:31:22 -0800
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@...erman.id.au>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
x86@...nel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>,
PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 0/4] introduce post-init read-only memory
One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce
the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By
making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the
attack surface.
Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed
again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong
thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items
into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro()
which happens after all kernel __init code has finished.
This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and uses
it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. Also
adds a new kernel parameter to help debug future use and adds an lkdtm
test to check the results.
-Kees
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
