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Date: Mon, 06 Aug 2012 16:55:31 -0700
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Matthew Wilcox <matthew@....cx>, Doug Ledford <dledford@...hat.com>, Joe Korty <joe.korty@...r.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...e.hu>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, James Morris <james.l.morris@...cle.com>, linux-doc@...r.kernel.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: add link restrictions
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> writes:
> On Thu, Aug 2, 2012 at 9:26 PM, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, 25 Jul 2012, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>>> This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS.
>>
>> Is Al happy with this now?
>
> Looks like it; thanks for checking. It's in mainline now:
> http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git;a=commitdiff;h=800179c9b8a1e796e441674776d11cd4c05d61d7
So there was one trivial little issue with your patch. You were
directly comparing kuids instead of using uid_eq. This only practically
matters when user namespaces are enabled which is currently impossible
in 3.6-rc1 :(
I have added the following fixup patch to my for-next branch of
user-namespace.git
From: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Aug 2012 09:38:08 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] userns: Fix link restrictions to use uid_eq
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>
---
fs/namei.c | 6 +++---
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1b46439..05480a6 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
- if (current_cred()->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
+ if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
- if (parent->i_uid == inode->i_uid)
+ if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
return 0;
path_put_conditional(link, nd);
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
* otherwise, it must be a safe source.
*/
- if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
+ if (uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
capable(CAP_FOWNER))
return 0;
--
1.7.5.4
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