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Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 11:03:15 -0700
From: Dave Hansen <>
To: Pekka Enberg <>
Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <>,
        Andrew Morton
 <>,, Kees Cook
        Cyrill Gorcunov <>,
        Al Viro
        Christoph Lameter <>,
        Matt Mackall <>,,, Dan Rosenberg <>,
        Theodore Tso
 <>, Alan Cox <>,
        Jesper Juhl
        Linus Torvalds <>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to

On Mon, 2011-09-19 at 20:51 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote:
> How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or
> VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does
> not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations? Isn't this
> much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo
> restriction? 

Mixing it up just adds noise.  It makes the attack somewhat more
difficult, but it still leaves open the possibility that the attacker
can filter out the noise somehow.

-- Dave

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