Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 11:03:15 -0700 From: Dave Hansen <dave@...ux.vnet.ibm.com> To: Pekka Enberg <penberg@...helsinki.fi> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@...curity.com>, Theodore Tso <tytso@....edu>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>, Jesper Juhl <jj@...osbits.net>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo On Mon, 2011-09-19 at 20:51 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote: > How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or > VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does > not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations? Isn't this > much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo > restriction? Mixing it up just adds noise. It makes the attack somewhat more difficult, but it still leaves open the possibility that the attacker can filter out the noise somehow. -- Dave
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