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Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 21:58:56 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <>
To: Pekka Enberg <>
Cc: Andrew Morton <>,, Kees Cook <>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <>,
	Al Viro <>,
	Christoph Lameter <>,
	Matt Mackall <>,,, Dan Rosenberg <>,
	Theodore Tso <>, Alan Cox <>,
	Jesper Juhl <>,
	Linus Torvalds <>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to

On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 20:51 +0300, Pekka Enberg wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 8:35 PM, Vasiliy Kulikov <> wrote:
> >> Yes, but there's no way for users to know where the allocations came from
> >> if you mix them up with other kmalloc-128 call-sites. That way the number
> >> of private files will stay private to the user, no? Doesn't that give you even
> >> better protection against the infoleak?
> >
> > No, what it gives us is an obscurity, not a protection.  I'm sure it
> > highly depends on the specific situation whether an attacker is able to
> > identify whether the call is from e.g. ecryptfs or from VFS.  Also the
> > correlation between the number in slabinfo and the real private actions
> > still exists.
> How is the attacker able to identify that we kmalloc()'d from ecryptfs or
> VFS based on non-root /proc/slabinfo when the slab allocator itself does
> not have that sort of information if you mix up the allocations?

How can you _guarantee_ that they mix?

> Isn't this
> much stronger protection especially if you combine that with /proc/slabinfo
> restriction?

I don't see any reason to change allocators if we close slabinfo.


Vasiliy Kulikov - bringing security into open computing environments

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