Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2011 10:45:20 -0700 From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@...il.com>, Shailabh Nagar <nagar@...ibm.com>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, security@...nel.org, Eric Paris <eparis@...hat.com>, Stephen Wilson <wilsons@...rt.ca>, KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@...fujitsu.com>, David Rientjes <rientjes@...gle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Balbir Singh <balbir@...ux.vnet.ibm.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: [Security] [PATCH 2/2] taskstats: restrict access to user On Mon, Sep 19, 2011 at 10:39 AM, Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com> wrote: > > Shouldn't it simply protect taskstats_user_cmd()? You may still poll > the counters with TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_PID/TASKSTATS_CMD_ATTR_TGID. Yeah, I wondered where I'd really want to hook it in, that was the other option. However, one thing that I'm currently independently asking some networking people is whether that patch guarantees anything at all: is the netlink command even guaranteed to be run in the same context as the person sending it? After all, it comes in as a packet of data. How synchronous is the genetlink thing guaranteed to be in the first place? IOW, are *any* of those "check current capabilities/euid" approaches really guaranteed to be valid? Are they valid today, will they necessarily be valid in a year? Linus
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