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Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2011 21:05:12 +0400
From: Vasiliy Kulikov <>
To: Andrew Morton <>
Cc:, Kees Cook <>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <>,
	Al Viro <>,
	Christoph Lameter <>,
	Pekka Enberg <>, Matt Mackall <>,,,
	Dan Rosenberg <>,
	Theodore Tso <>, Alan Cox <>,
	Jesper Juhl <>,
	Linus Torvalds <>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to

Hi Andrew,

On Wed, Sep 14, 2011 at 12:27 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 08:41:34PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> > Historically /proc/slabinfo has 0444 permissions and is accessible to
> > the world.  slabinfo contains rather private information related both to
> > the kernel and userspace tasks.  Depending on the situation, it might
> > reveal either private information per se or information useful to make
> > another targeted attack.  Some examples of what can be learned by
> > reading/watching for /proc/slabinfo entries:
> > ...
> > World readable slabinfo simplifies kernel developers' job of debugging
> > kernel bugs (e.g. memleaks), but I believe it does more harm than
> > benefits.  For most users 0444 slabinfo is an unreasonable attack vector.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <>
> Haven't had any mass complaints about the 0400 in Ubuntu (sorry Dave!), so
> I'm obviously for it.
> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <>

Looks like the members of the previous slabinfo discussion don't object
against the patch now and it got two other Reviewed-by responses.  Can
you merge it as-is or should I probably convince someone else?


Vasiliy Kulikov - bringing security into open computing environments

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