Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2011 12:27:44 -0700
From: Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>
To: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
        Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@...il.com>,
        Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
        Christoph Lameter <cl@...ux-foundation.org>,
        Pekka Enberg <penberg@...nel.org>, Matt Mackall <mpm@...enic.com>,
        linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-mm@...ck.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] mm: restrict access to /proc/slabinfo

Hi Vasiliy,

On Sat, Sep 10, 2011 at 08:41:34PM +0400, Vasiliy Kulikov wrote:
> Historically /proc/slabinfo has 0444 permissions and is accessible to
> the world.  slabinfo contains rather private information related both to
> the kernel and userspace tasks.  Depending on the situation, it might
> reveal either private information per se or information useful to make
> another targeted attack.  Some examples of what can be learned by
> reading/watching for /proc/slabinfo entries:
> ...
> World readable slabinfo simplifies kernel developers' job of debugging
> kernel bugs (e.g. memleaks), but I believe it does more harm than
> benefits.  For most users 0444 slabinfo is an unreasonable attack vector.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@...nwall.com>

Haven't had any mass complaints about the 0400 in Ubuntu (sorry Dave!), so
I'm obviously for it.

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@...ntu.com>

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Ubuntu Security Team

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.