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Message-ID: <CAN_LGv3uxE6EjPPbRreaQPL-UTOwLmmZ8NxxiZBx-wcaAF1Ykw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 10:28:31 +0800
From: Alexander Patrakov <patrakov@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Security Audit of Hex, the Erlang package manager
Hello Alan,
How am I, as a user, supposed to authenticate these PDFs as materials
really produced by the parties Hex claims they are from? The PDFs are
offered for download from the audited-party domain, not from the auditors'
domains, and do not contain any digital signatures.
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 4:16 AM Alan Coopersmith <
alan.coopersmith@...cle.com> wrote:
> https://hex.pm/blog/security-audit announces the completion of a
> security audit & penetration testing of Hex, the Erlang package manager,
> funded by the OpenSSF and overseen by the Erlang Ecosystem Foundation.
>
> This work was done by two independent security firms, Paraxial.io and
> zentrust partners GmbH, who each produced their own reports:
> - https://hex.pm/reports/2026/paraxial.pdf
> - https://hex.pm/reports/2026/zentrust.pdf
>
> The announcement reports:
>
> > What was found
> > --------------
> >
> > Across both audits, a number of issues were identified, ranging from high
> > severity vulnerabilities to low-severity hardening gaps.
> >
> > Examples include:
> >
> > * Unsafe deserialization in hex_core that could lead to RCE under
> certain
> > conditions
> > * A denial of service condition during package uploads
> > * Weaknesses in authentication flows and API key handling
> > * Gaps in CI/CD hardening (GitHub Actions)
> > * Missing or incomplete security controls in some areas
> >
> > Importantly, the audits focused on realistic attack scenarios such as:
> >
> > * cross-account package tampering
> > * bypassing integrity checks
> > * injection in public-facing features
> > * CI/CD compromise
> >
> > What we fixed
> > -------------
> >
> > Most findings have been remediated during the engagement and confirmed in
> > re-tests.
> >
> > Highlights:
> >
> > * Fixed unsafe deserialization in hex_core (CVE-2026-21619)
> > * Fixed API key privilege escalation (CVE-2026-21621)
> > * Fixed password reset issues (CVE-2026-21622)
> > * Fixed XSS in OAuth device flow (CVE-2026-21618)
> > * Fixed denial of service in package upload (CVE-2026-23940)
> > * Removed sensitive credentials from repositories
> > * Hardened authentication flows (including "sudo mode" for sensitive
> actions)
> > * Disabled legacy TLS versions
> > * Improved CSP and other browser security controls
> >
> > Re-tests by both firms confirmed that the majority of vulnerabilities
> were
> > successfully remediated.
> >
> > Several remaining items are either:
> >
> > * accepted risks with clear rationale (for example UX trade-offs or
> staged
> > migrations), or
> > * dependent on ecosystem-wide changes (for example client updates)
> >
> > What we decided not to change (yet)
> > -----------------------------------
> >
> > Some findings reflect intentional trade-offs or transitional states
> rather
> > than vulnerabilities.
> >
> > Examples:
> >
> > * Basic authentication and optional 2FA are still supported for
> compatibility
> > with existing clients. Both will be phased out once all clients
> support the
> > OAuth2 device flow.
> > * Certain features (like documentation hosting) intentionally allow
> > user-provided content and are being isolated rather than restricted.
> >
> > These decisions were reviewed jointly by the Hex.pm team and the EEF.
>
> These issues appear to be reported against the hexpm server side, not the
> client
> side that end users & distros are likely to be running:
>
> - Cross-site scripting (XSS) in OAuth Device Authorization screen
> (CVE-2026-21618)
> https://github.com/hexpm/hexpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6cw9-5gg4-rhpj
>
> - Improper Scope Enforcement in OAuth client_credentials Flow Allows
> Read-Only
> API Key to Escalate to Full Access with Valid 2FA Code (CVE-2026-21621)
> https://github.com/hexpm/hexpm/security/advisories/GHSA-739m-8727-j6w3
>
> - Password Reset Tokens Do Not Expire (CVE-2026-21622)
> https://github.com/hexpm/hexpm/security/advisories/GHSA-6r94-pvwf-mxqm
>
> - Path Traversal in Local File Store Backend (Development and Self-Hosted
> Registry Setups) (CVE-2026-23939)
> https://github.com/hexpm/hexpm/security/advisories/GHSA-42mv-r64p-4869
>
> - Publishing Oversized Package Can Trigger Denial of Service
> (CVE-2026-23940)
> https://github.com/hexpm/hexpm/security/advisories/GHSA-jp8w-gxf6-8hcr
>
> That leaves one CVE for distros and end users to worry about -
> https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/security/advisories/GHSA-hx9w-f2w9-9g96
> reports:
> > Unsafe Deserialization of Erlang Terms in hex_core
> > --------------------------------------------------
> >
> > maennchen published GHSA-hx9w-f2w9-9g96 Feb 27, 2026
> >
> > Package: hex (otp)
> > Affected versions: >= 2.3.0 and <= 2.3.2
> > Patched versions: 2.3.2
> >
> > Package: hex_core (Erlang)
> > Affected versions: <= 0.12.1
> > Patched versions: 0.12.1
> >
> > Package: rebar3 (otp)
> > Affected versions: >= 3.9.1 and <= 3.27.0
> > Patched versions: 3.27.0
> >
> > Impact
> > ------
> > The Hex client (hex_core) deserializes Erlang terms received from the
> > Hex API using binary_to_term/1 without sufficient restrictions.
> >
> > If an attacker can control the HTTP response body returned by the Hex
> API,
> > this allows denial-of-service attacks such as atom table exhaustion,
> leading
> > to a VM crash. No released versions are known to allow remote code
> execution.
> >
> > Patches
> > -------
> >
> https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/commit/cdf726095bca85ad2549d146df1e831ae93c2b13
> >
> https://github.com/hexpm/hex/commit/636739f3322514e9303ca335fb630696fcbb3c95
> >
> https://github.com/erlang/rebar3/commit/1d4478f527e373de0b225951e53115450e0d9b9d
> >
> > Workarounds
> > -----------
> > Ensure that the Hex API URL (HEX_API_URL) points only to trusted
> endpoints.
> > There is no client-side workaround that fully mitigates this issue
> without
> > applying the patch.
> >
> > References
> > ----------
> > - hex_core Module:
> https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/blob/main/src/hex_api.erl
> > - Hex Vendored Module:
> https://github.com/hexpm/hex/blob/main/src/mix_hex_api.erl
> > - Rebar3 Vendored Module:
> https://github.com/erlang/rebar3/blob/main/apps/rebar/src/vendored/r3_hex_api.erl
> > - hex_core Patch: cdf7260
> > - Hex Vendored Patch: hexpm/hex@...739f
> > - Rebar3 Vendored Patch: erlang/rebar3@...478f
> >
> > Severity: Low - 2.0 / 10
> > CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
> > CVE ID: CVE-2026-21619
> > Weaknesses:
> > - CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
> > - CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data
>
>
>
--
Alexander Patrakov
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