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Message-ID: <20260410021023.GA20691@openwall.com>
Date: Fri, 10 Apr 2026 04:10:23 +0200
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@...-dsec.de>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: X41 Advisory X41-2026-001: Guardrail Sandbox Escape in LiteLLM
Hi,
Thank you Markus for posting this to oss-security on time.
On Thu, Apr 09, 2026 at 12:51:06AM +0200, Markus Vervier wrote:
> Workarounds
> ===========
>
> No vendor patch is available at the time of publication. Users could
> apply the following mitigations:
Somehow this section just ended with the above, without actually listing
any mitigations. The copy of this advisory on the X41 website:
https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2026-001-litellm/
actually includes the mitigations, which I'll copy-paste to here:
> - Block the endpoint at the reverse proxy level: If LiteLLM is deployed
> behind a reverse proxy such as nginx or Caddy, deny requests to
> /guardrails/test_custom_code. For example in nginx: location
> /guardrails/test_custom_code { deny all; return 403; }
>
> - Restrict access to the admin API: The affected endpoint requires
> authentication with the master key. Ensure the master key is only known
> to trusted administrators and is not shared with regular API consumers.
>
> - Do not expose the LiteLLM management interface to untrusted networks:
> Use network-level controls (firewall rules, VPC security groups) to
> limit access to the LiteLLM admin port to trusted hosts only.
>
> - Avoid running LiteLLM as root: The default Docker image runs the process
> as root, maximizing the impact of code execution. Use --user to run the
> container as an unprivileged user to limit post-exploitation impact.
Alexander
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