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Message-ID: <acvvA2uP7s/aGD9q@256bit.org>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2026 17:57:55 +0200
From: Christian Brabandt <cb@...bit.org>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@...il.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: [vim-security] Vim tabpanel modeline escape
 affects Vim < 9.2.0272


On Mo, 30 Mär 2026, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:

> On 3/30/26 05:06, Christian Brabandt wrote:
> > ## Impact
> > An attacker who can deliver a crafted file to a victim achieves 
> > arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running Vim. 
> > The attack requires only that the victim opens the file; no further 
> > interaction is needed. `modeline` is enabled by default and 
> > `modelineexpr` does not need to be enabled. Vim builds with `+tabpanel` 
> > (FEAT_HUGE, the default) are affected.
> 
> Should `modeline` be disabled by default in future releases?
> It's a huge attack surface.

Indeed, it is probably time to disable this by default: 
https://github.com/vim/vim/pull/19875

Thanks,
Christian
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