[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <e1cbe881-2d13-442f-8977-39baaad84ec8@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2026 06:20:28 -0400
From: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Christian Brabandt <cb@...bit.org>
Subject: Re: [vim-security] Vim tabpanel modeline escape
affects Vim < 9.2.0272
On 3/30/26 05:06, Christian Brabandt wrote:
> ## Impact
> An attacker who can deliver a crafted file to a victim achieves
> arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running Vim.
> The attack requires only that the victim opens the file; no further
> interaction is needed. `modeline` is enabled by default and
> `modelineexpr` does not need to be enabled. Vim builds with `+tabpanel`
> (FEAT_HUGE, the default) are affected.
Should `modeline` be disabled by default in future releases?
It's a huge attack surface.
--
Sincerely,
Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)
Download attachment "OpenPGP_0xB288B55FFF9C22C1.asc" of type "application/pgp-keys" (7141 bytes)
Download attachment "OpenPGP_signature.asc" of type "application/pgp-signature" (834 bytes)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
