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Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 10:22:17 -0500 (EST)
From: Wietse Venema <wietse@...cupine.org>
To: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
CC: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Wietse Venema <wietse@...cupine.org>
Subject: Re: Postfix updated SMTP smuggling countermeasure

Solar Designer:
> If I'm reading this right, the initial implementation of Postfix
> smtpd_forbid_bare_newline disallowed bare LF not only at the end of
> DATA, but also elsewhere in the SMTP session.  This is now relaxed in
> the recommended "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize" mode to apply
> only to the end of DATA, while allowing bare LFs elsewhere.  This is
> sufficient to prevent the attack while having better compatibility with
> existing SMTP clients.

Indeed. The "reject all bare LF" option remains available for sites
that are less concerned about breaking changes.

	Wietse

> ----- Forwarded message from Wietse Venema via Postfix-announce <postfix-announce@...tfix.org> -----
> 
> To: Postfix announce <postfix-announce@...tfix.org>
> Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 09:01:59 -0500 (EST)
> Subject: [pfx-ann] Postfix stable release 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24
> From: Wietse Venema via Postfix-announce <postfix-announce@...tfix.org>
> Reply-To: Wietse Venema <wietse@...cupine.org>
> 
> [An on-line version of this announcement will be available at
> https://www.postfix.org/announcements/postfix-3.8.5.html]
> 
> [Fixes for Postfix versions < 3.5 will be announced at
> https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html]
> 
> Postfix stable release 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24
> 
> Security: this release improves support to defend against an email
> spoofing attack (SMTP smuggling) on recipients at a Postfix server. For
> background, see https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html.
> 
> The improvements provide better logging, and better compatibility with
> existing SMTP clients (less need to allowlist clients).
> 
> Sites concerned about SMTP smuggling attacks should enable this feature
> on Internet-facing Postfix servers. For compatibility with non-standard
> clients, Postfix by default excludes clients in mynetworks from this
> countermeasure.
> 
> The recommended settings are:
> 
>     # Require the standard End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
>     # Otherwise, allow bare <LF> and process it as if the client sent
>     # <CR><LF>.
>     #
>     # This maintains compatibility with many legitimate SMTP client
>     # applications that send a mix of standard and non-standard line
>     # endings, but will fail to receive email from client implementations
>     # that do not terminate DATA content with the standard End-of-DATA
>     # sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
>     #
>     # Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
>     # The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks.
>     #
>     smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize
>     smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks
> 
> Notes:
> 
>   * The default setting is "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = no" in Postfix
>     releases < 3.9, for compatibility reasons. This means that Postfix
>     is by default vulnerable to SMTP smuggling.
> 
>   * The new setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize" is the
>     default for Postfix releases 3.9 and later.
> 
>   * The old setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = yes" is now an alias for
>     "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize".
> 
>   * The new setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject" will refuse
>     commands or message content with a bare newline. For details see
>     the RELEASE_NOTES or the postconf(5) documentation.
> 
> You can find the updated Postfix source code at the mirrors listed
> at https://www.postfix.org/.
> 
> 	Wietse
> _______________________________________________
> Postfix-announce mailing list -- postfix-announce@...tfix.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to postfix-announce-leave@...tfix.org
> 
> ----- End forwarded message -----

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