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Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:29:06 +0100
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Wietse Venema <wietse@...cupine.org>
Subject: Postfix updated SMTP smuggling countermeasure
If I'm reading this right, the initial implementation of Postfix
smtpd_forbid_bare_newline disallowed bare LF not only at the end of
DATA, but also elsewhere in the SMTP session. This is now relaxed in
the recommended "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize" mode to apply
only to the end of DATA, while allowing bare LFs elsewhere. This is
sufficient to prevent the attack while having better compatibility with
existing SMTP clients.
----- Forwarded message from Wietse Venema via Postfix-announce <postfix-announce@...tfix.org> -----
To: Postfix announce <postfix-announce@...tfix.org>
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 09:01:59 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [pfx-ann] Postfix stable release 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24
From: Wietse Venema via Postfix-announce <postfix-announce@...tfix.org>
Reply-To: Wietse Venema <wietse@...cupine.org>
[An on-line version of this announcement will be available at
https://www.postfix.org/announcements/postfix-3.8.5.html]
[Fixes for Postfix versions < 3.5 will be announced at
https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html]
Postfix stable release 3.8.5, 3.7.10, 3.6.14, 3.5.24
Security: this release improves support to defend against an email
spoofing attack (SMTP smuggling) on recipients at a Postfix server. For
background, see https://www.postfix.org/smtp-smuggling.html.
The improvements provide better logging, and better compatibility with
existing SMTP clients (less need to allowlist clients).
Sites concerned about SMTP smuggling attacks should enable this feature
on Internet-facing Postfix servers. For compatibility with non-standard
clients, Postfix by default excludes clients in mynetworks from this
countermeasure.
The recommended settings are:
# Require the standard End-of-DATA sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
# Otherwise, allow bare <LF> and process it as if the client sent
# <CR><LF>.
#
# This maintains compatibility with many legitimate SMTP client
# applications that send a mix of standard and non-standard line
# endings, but will fail to receive email from client implementations
# that do not terminate DATA content with the standard End-of-DATA
# sequence <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>.
#
# Such clients can be allowlisted with smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions.
# The example below allowlists SMTP clients in trusted networks.
#
smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize
smtpd_forbid_bare_newline_exclusions = $mynetworks
Notes:
* The default setting is "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = no" in Postfix
releases < 3.9, for compatibility reasons. This means that Postfix
is by default vulnerable to SMTP smuggling.
* The new setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize" is the
default for Postfix releases 3.9 and later.
* The old setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = yes" is now an alias for
"smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = normalize".
* The new setting "smtpd_forbid_bare_newline = reject" will refuse
commands or message content with a bare newline. For details see
the RELEASE_NOTES or the postconf(5) documentation.
You can find the updated Postfix source code at the mirrors listed
at https://www.postfix.org/.
Wietse
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----- End forwarded message -----
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