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Date: Sat, 7 Aug 2021 15:26:09 -0500 (CDT)
From: Ariadne Conill <>
To: Axel Beckert <>
cc: Salvatore Bonaccorso <>,, 
    Ariadne Conill <>,,,
Subject: Re: Re: Bug#991971: [Lynx-dev] bug in Lynx' SSL
 certificate validation -> leaks password in clear text via SNI (under some


On Sat, 7 Aug 2021, Axel Beckert wrote:

> Hi Salvatore, Dear Ariadne,
> Salvatore Bonaccorso wrote:
>>> This is more severe than it initially looked like: Due to TLS Server
>>> Name Indication (SNI) the hostname as parsed by Lynx (i.e with
>>> "user:pass@" included) is sent in _clear_ text over the wire even
>>> _before_ I can even said "n" for "no, don't continue to talk with this
>>> server" in Lynx's prompt as shown above.
> […]
>>> IMHO this nevertheless needs a CVE-ID.
>> MITRE did assign CVE-2021-38165.
> Thanks Salvatore. I updated the debian/changelog entry for the next
> upload as well as the title of the Debian bug report.

+1, thanks for getting a CVE for this.

>> MITRE raised the question: Does 2.9.0dev.9 (mentioned on the
>> page) fix the
>> entire problem?
> At this point a huge thanks to Thomas Dickey (Lynx upstream) for
> providing a fixed version so quickly!

I think 2.9.0dev.9 fixes the problem, even if the fix is, well, not the 
way I would do it.

>> claims that
>> credentials appear in the HTTP Host header to an http:// (i.e.,
>> non-SSL) website.
> Indeed and a good point.
> Citing from Ariadne's mail:
>> The issue itself is far more severe: HTParse() does not understand
>> the authn part of the URI at all.
> […]
>> But it will also leak in the Host: header on unencrypted
>> connections, and also probably SSL ones too.
> But that looks to me as if Ariadne just refers to the code and hasn't
> actually checked it by trying it. Nevertheless thanks to Ariadne for
> having had a look and proposing a patch!

Yes, this was my guess since HTParse() doesn't understand the authn part. 
But this seems like a rather unfortunate design: parse the URI wrong, and 
then "fix" it later?  Why not just parse the URI right, to begin with?

So strange...


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