Follow @Openwall on Twitter for new release announcements and other news
[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Sun, 10 Jan 2021 19:08:42 +0100
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: distros list archive

Hi,

I've just updated the headers-only archives of (linux-)distros mentioned
in the message below to include headers of everything posted until
December 31, 2020.  There was relatively little need for this for a
while due to the statistics kindly maintained by Gentoo, but now those
are lagging behind (last updated until September 2019 inclusive).  They
will need to also be updated, and I felt updating these archives might
help with hopefully making that upcoming update and with its review.

Alexander

On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 11:42:05PM +0100, Solar Designer wrote:
> On Sat, Jun 24, 2017 at 06:39:50PM +0200, Solar Designer wrote:
> > I've just set up these archives of the private lists up until June 19:
> > 
> > http://www.openwall.com/lists/linux-distros/
> > http://www.openwall.com/lists/distros/
> > 
> > I did not decrypt the actual messages, but the statistics and the
> > message headers should provide some visibility into how much and roughly
> > what was discussed and when.
> 
> I've just updated these with message headers until November 19 (although
> there was nothing posted after November 9, until further still-embargoed
> messages appeared today).
> 
> > The messages appearing on distros should be strictly a subset of those
> > appearing on linux-distros, as per the description of the lists here:
> > 
> > http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros
> > 
> > As you may notice, the Subject lines sometimes contain [vs] and other
> > times [vs-plain].  This reflects whether the messages traveled to the
> > list exploder in encrypted or plaintext form, respectively.  They
> > traveled to the list members in re-encrypted form either way.  The
> > [vs-plain] case commonly occurs on messages CC'ed to other parties, for
> > which the sender might not have had the keys.  MUAs generally don't
> > allow a message to be encrypted to a subset of the addressees and sent
> > in plaintext to others.
> > 
> > Enjoy.
> 
> Alexander

Powered by blists - more mailing lists

Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.

Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.