Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2020 05:47:04 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@...rmont.com> To: Pramod Rana <varchashva@...il.com> Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Open Source Tool | vPrioritization | Risk Prioritization Framework [Perhaps somewhat off topic, but the original announcement felt a bit tangental as well.] On Thu, 3 Sep 2020 20:13:34 +0530 Pramod Rana <varchashva@...il.com> wrote: > It is no secret that today we have more vulnerabilities than we can > assess and remediate, timely and comprehensively. Risk > prioritization is a key component for any vulnerability management > program. I'm not sure I agree with this premise. 1. It is entirely feasible to keep even a very large organization comprehensively patched. There are organizations that do that. 2. It is not feasible to calculate a probability of exploitation of a given vulnerability, and it is not feasible to determine how bad the damage from exploitation will be. This is a classic example of "tail risk" where probability distributions are simply not calculable by normal methods. I keep hearing people in the security industry speak about scientific risk assessment as though it were possible. I don't think it's possible, and it seems cheaper to simply patch than to do some sort of scientific assessment and prioritization of patches. My gut reaction is that the growth of this idea is attributable to the large number of large, well-funded organizations that are none the less not capable of properly maintaining their own infrastructure and thus not capable of patching in a timely manner. (I have consulted to many such organizations.) The notion that some sort of "risk analytics" could therefore justify failing to patch quickly and give a rationale for maintaining an incapable systems management team is thus attractive. However, the real solution is simply to patch; a capable systems management team is better than the illusion of a risk calculation system, and provides far more benefits than simply maintaining infrastructure in a fully patched state. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger perry@...rmont.com
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.