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Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 16:24:54 +0100
From: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@...gle.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...gle.com>
Subject: Re: Linux kernel: CVE-2017-18344: arbitrary-read vulnerability in the
timer subsystem
On Thu, Aug 2, 2018 at 8:57 PM Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...il.com> wrote:
>
> Hi!
>
> Syzkaller/syzbot found a global-out-of-bounds bug in the timer
> subsystem of the Linux kernel [1], that is exploitable and can be used
> to gain an arbitrary-read primitive. This allows to access kernel
> memory and leak keys, credentials or other sensitive information that
> is stored there (so the bug has a similar impact to Meltdown). I'll
> share a PoC exploit in a week.
>
> The bug was introduced in commit 57b8015e ("posix-timers: Show
> sigevent info in proc file") [2] in 3.10 and fixed by commit cef31d9a
> ("posix-timer: Properly check sigevent->sigev_notify") [3] in
> 4.15-rc4. The bug only affects kernels that have CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
> and CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE enabled, which is done by a lot of
> modern distros.
>
> This bug has been fixed in Ubuntu 16.04 [7], but still affects at
> least CentOS 7 at this moment (at least 3.10.0-862.9.1.el7.x86_64 that
> I've checked). I haven't checked the other distros.
[...]
> Then I decided to take a look at the CentOS kernel. I was quite
> surprised to find out that this bug hasn't been fixed there at all. I
> was under the impression that most Linux distros either follow stable
> kernel branches or monitor upstream commits for security related fixes
> themselves. It seems that this is not the case. Perhaps this fix was
> missed because CentOS 7 kernel is based on the 3.10 kernel version,
> and the 3.10 stable kernel release stopped being supported in November
> 2017.
This bug has finally been fixed in the Red Hat kernels [1] (so it's
probably fixed in CentOS as well, do they use the same kernel?), which
took another 3 months since my announcement on oss-security and 11
months since the initial syzbot bug report.
[1] https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3083
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