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Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 18:13:34 +0200
From: zugtprgfwprz@...rnkuller.de
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Travis CI MITM RCE
Hi Daniel,
On 28.08.2018 18:43, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> In some ways, the keyserver network has done the OpenPGP community a
> disservice, by encouraging OpenPGP users to refer to keys by
> fingerprints (or even worse, by key IDs). While this is a useful
> shorthand in some contexts, it's really a security/reliability
> anti-pattern when it comes to secure programming.
I agree about the "key ID" part, but not about the "fingerprint" part.
Pinning a cryptographic hash over a public key isn't a security
antipattern by any strech of the imagination. Sure, you could argue that
the SHA-1 used by GPG isn't state-of-the-art anymore, but we're not
talking about collision attacks, but second preimage attacks. Far worse
for the attacker.
The way you phrased it, however, all applications of fingerprints/hashes
would be broken (SSH fingerprints, HPKP, etc.), regardless of the hash
function they use.
Cheers,
Joe
t
--
"A PC without Windows is like a chocolate cake without mustard."
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