Date: Thu, 23 Aug 2018 07:58:51 -0500 (CDT) From: Bob Friesenhahn <bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: Re: Re: More Ghostscript Issues: Should we disable PS coders in policy.xml by default? On Wed, 22 Aug 2018, Leonardo Taccari wrote: > Hello Bob, > > Bob Friesenhahn writes: >> The CERT advisory at https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/332928 provides a >> policy.xml example which does not appear to block PS2 and PS3, which >> are also entry points for reading Postscript. >> [...] > > If I am not missing something I think that ghostscript isn't used > for them though. You are missing something. While they are unlikely to be triggered by default (but still could be triggered by an attacker with sufficient control), testing shows that convert -verbose PS2:file.ps outfile.png convert -verbose file.ps2 outfile.png convert -verbose PS3:file.ps outfile.png convert -verbose file.ps3 outfile.png does in fact invoke Ghostscript. Bob -- Bob Friesenhahn bfriesen@...ple.dallas.tx.us, http://www.simplesystems.org/users/bfriesen/ GraphicsMagick Maintainer, http://www.GraphicsMagick.org/
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.