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Date: Sat, 18 Nov 2017 08:26:47 +0100
From: Daniel Beck <ml@...kweb.net>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Multiple vulnerabilities in Jenkins
> On 8. Nov 2017, at 11:56, Daniel Beck <ml@...kweb.net> wrote:
>
> SECURITY-499
> Jenkins stores metadata related to "people", which encompasses actual user
> accounts, as well as users appearing in SCM, in directories corresponding
> to the user ID on disk. These directories used the user ID for their name
> without additional escaping. This potentially resulted in a number of
> problems, such as the following:
> 1. User names consisting of a single forward slash would have their user
> record stored in the parent directory; deleting this user deleted all user
> records.
> 2. User names containing character sequences such as .. could be used to
> clobber other configuration files in Jenkins.
> 3. User names could consist of reserved names such as COM (on Windows).
CVE-2017-1000391
> SECURITY-641
> Autocompletion suggestions for text fields were not escaped, resulting in a
> persisted cross-site scripting vulnerability if the source for the
> suggestions allowed specifying text that includes HTML metacharacters like
> less-than and greater-than characters.
CVE-2017-1000392
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