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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 10:41:48 -0400
From: Adam Shannon <>
Subject: Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files

metasploit has had such a check available for a while now.

On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Solar Designer <> wrote:

> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 02:35:59PM +0100, Jakub Wilk wrote:
> > There's another problem with vim swapfiles.
> >
> > If you edit a file directly in /tmp, vim will happily read a swapfile
> > that were planted there by somebody else. Local users could exploit this
> > for denial of service (or maybe worse if there are any swapfile parsing
> > bugs...).
> >
> > Is that a bug in vim? Or is it a user error to edit file directly in
> > /tmp?
> Almost all manual uses of /tmp are user errors, yet we could want to
> harden programs to make such misuses less risky.
> > In the latter case, we should fix at least vipe(1) and vidir(1) from
> > moreutils; and run-mailcap(1).
> Alexander

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