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Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2017 12:53:22 -0400
From: Gordo Lowrey <gordo@...eval.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Fw: Security risk of vim swap files
It's not the fault of the program if an end-user insists upon use of a
stupid configuration. There's no problem with VIM here IMO.
As others have said, your version control should ignore swap files,
first of all, so they are not deployed.
If you do edit a file on the server, directly, then you should ensure
proper configuration, which brings to the second point: you should put
your swap/temp files into a directory that only you can control, like
~/.vim/{backup/tmp} or ~/.local/tmp, etc...
On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 31, 2017 at 02:35:59PM +0100, Jakub Wilk wrote:
>> There's another problem with vim swapfiles.
>>
>> If you edit a file directly in /tmp, vim will happily read a
>> swapfile
>> that were planted there by somebody else. Local users could exploit
>> this
>> for denial of service (or maybe worse if there are any swapfile
>> parsing
>> bugs...).
>>
>> Is that a bug in vim? Or is it a user error to edit file directly in
>> /tmp?
>
> Almost all manual uses of /tmp are user errors, yet we could want to
> harden programs to make such misuses less risky.
>
>> In the latter case, we should fix at least vipe(1) and vidir(1) from
>> moreutils; and run-mailcap(1).
>
> Alexander
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