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Date: Fri, 30 Sep 2016 23:32:17 -0400 (EDT)
From: cve-assign@...re.org
To: michael.santillana@...ork.com
Cc: cve-assign@...re.org, oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, infosec@...ork.com
Subject: Re: CVE Request - Ruby OpenSSL Library - IV Reuse in GCM Mode

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> https://github.com/ruby/openssl/issues/49
> https://github.com/ruby/openssl/commit/8108e0a6db133f3375608303fdd2083eb5115062
> http://stackoverflow.com/questions/35991551
> https://github.com/attr-encrypted/attr_encrypted/issues/203
> https://github.com/attr-encrypted/encryptor/pull/22

> A developer that uses the code above may incorrectly assume that their code
> is secure from the pitfalls associated with IV reuse in aes-*-gcm, since
> the 'cipher.random_iv' method is used. According to the documentation, this
> should generate a random IV each time the encryption method is called.

> even though the random_iv method is called, the code is defaulting to
> a static IV.

>> Cipher#iv= does not preserve the IV in gctx->iv because gctx->key_set
>> is already set by the pre-initialization in Cipher#initialize, and the
>> subsequent call of Cipher#key= resets the IV to uninitialized (zeroed
>> by OPENSSL_zalloc() in EVP_CipherInit_ex()) gctx->iv.

Use CVE-2016-7798 for this issue in the openssl gem for Ruby. (Note
that https://github.com/ruby/openssl/blob/master/History.md describes
this as "openssl gem, formerly a standard library of Ruby,
ext/openssl.") The same CVE ID applies to the effects of this
vulnerability on the encryptor gem and the attr_encrypted gem.

- -- 
CVE Assignment Team
M/S M300, 202 Burlington Road, Bedford, MA 01730 USA
[ A PGP key is available for encrypted communications at
  http://cve.mitre.org/cve/request_id.html ]
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