Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 09:32:56 -0700 From: Roland Dreier <roland@...estorage.com> To: Shachar Raindel <raindel@...lanox.com> Cc: "oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, "<linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org> (linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org)" <linux-rdma@...r.kernel.org>, "stable@...r.kernel.org" <stable@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: CVE-2014-8159 kernel: infiniband: uverbs: unprotected physical memory access On Thu, Apr 2, 2015 at 12:52 AM, Shachar Raindel <raindel@...lanox.com> wrote: > This is a common practice in the security industry, called > "responsible disclosure." > > Following the kernel security bugs policy , we reported it to > the kernel security contacts few days before making the issue public. > Few days after issue became public, we published a clear report to all > of the relevant mailing lists. Isn't the point of responsible disclosure to delay disclosure until a fix is in place? What's the point of sending a notification to the kernel security team if you're going to disclose publicly before the upstream kernel is fixed? - R.
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