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Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2014 01:41:10 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com,
"Joshua J. Drake" <oss-sec-pmgetbl@...p.org>
CC: Tero Marttila <terom@...me.fi>
Subject: Re: CVE request: procmail heap overflow in getlline()
On 04/12/14 12:57 AM, Santiago Vila wrote:
> On Wed, Dec 03, 2014 at 05:30:57PM -0600, Joshua J. Drake wrote:
>> Is it possible to trigger this issue with untrusted input or only
>> trusted input from procmailrc?
>
> This is an issue with the handling of .procmailrc file, which contains
> the filter rules for procmail. An external attacker is not supposed to
> provide the .procmailrc file at /home/user, only the email to be
> filtered, so, IMHO, this is a bug but maybe not a security bug.
>
> Thanks.
I disagree. Many mail servers allow people to edit their .procmailrc but
explicitly block shell accounts. This would allow a user with a non
interactive shell account to execute arbitrary commands using procmailrc
even if they were otherwise restricted (e.g. using permissions or
SELinux for example). I bet if gmail filters allowed code exec Google
would seriously freak out and fix it asap =).
--
Kurt Seifried -- Red Hat -- Product Security -- Cloud
PGP A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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