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Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2014 12:44:34 -0600
From: "Vincent Danen" <>
To: "OSS Security List" <>
Subject: CVE request: multiple /tmp races in ppc64-diag

Just quoting from our bug report:

As noted in the SUSE bug report, numerous /tmp race conditions exist in ppc64-diag, in particular:

rtas_errd/diag_support.c:233:   char command[]="/usr/bin/find /proc/device-tree -name status -print > /tmp/get_dt_files";
rtas_errd/diag_support.c:241:   fp1 = fopen("/tmp/get_dt_files", "r");
rtas_errd/prrn_hotplug:8:TMPFILE=`mktemp -p /tmp`
scripts/ppc64_diag_mkrsrc:126:mkdir "/tmp/diagSEsnap", 0775;
scripts/ppc64_diag_mkrsrc:127:$general_eed_file = "/tmp/diagSEsnap/snapH.tar.gz";

In the case of rtas_errd/prrn_hotplug, mktemp is used but is assumed to have succeeded; there is no check for the return value.

mktemp should probably be used properly in all of these.  I don't know if the data in /tmp/diagSEsnap is sensitive or not, but if it is, the permissions on that directory should probably be tightened up.

I think a single CVE should suffice for this.  The above is from ppc64-diag-2.6.1.



Vincent Danen / Red Hat Product Security
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